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Abstract We examine the basic question of whether pressure is stressful. We propose that 
when examining the role of stress or pressure in cognitive performance it is important to 
consider the type of pressure, the stress response, and the aspect of cognition assessed. In 
Experiment 1, outcome pressure was not experienced as stressful but did lead to impaired 
performance on a rule-based (RB) category learning task and not a more procedural 
information-integration (II) task. In Experiment 2, the addition of monitoring pressure resulted in 
a modest stress response to combined pressure and impairment on both tasks. Across 
experiments, higher stress appraisals were associated with decreased performance on the RB, 
but not the II, task. In turn, higher stress-reactivity (heart rate) was associated with enhanced 
performance on the II, but not the RB, task. This work represents an initial step towards 
integrating the stress-cognition and pressure-cognition literatures and suggests that integrating 
these fields may require consideration of the type of pressure, the stress-response, and the 
cognitive system mediating performance.  




From family life to social life to work life, 
pressure and stress are so ubiquitous in 
modern life that it is no surprise that 
psychologists have taken great interest in the 
impact of pressure and stress on cognitive 
performance. Although pressure-cognition 
and stress-cognition research have 
proceeded somewhat independently, it is 
quite common to assume that pressure is 
stressful (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Masters, 
1992; Staal, 2004). Despite the face validity of 
this assumption, there have been few direct 
tests of this prediction. This question is 
particularly important in light of recent studies 
demonstrating that cognitive performance can 
vary as a function of the pressure 
manipulation (DeCaro et al., 2011) and the 
stress response (e.g., Ell et al., 2011). In the 
current research, we take an initial step 
towards integrating pressure and stress 
research by examining whether pressure is 
experienced as stressful. 
 
What is pressure? 
Individuals experience pressure when they 
must perform to their potential in order to 
achieve a goal (Baumeister, 1984). This type 
of outcome pressure is often induced by 
increasing the difficulty of reaching some goal 
and/or providing an incentive that is 
contingent on performance. Outcome 
pressure is thought to co-opt working memory 
and attentional resources, resulting in 
impairment in cognitive tasks dependent on 
these processes (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Lewis 
& Linder, 1997; Markman et al., 2006).  
Pressure may also be induced by social 
evaluation or social monitoring (e.g., an 
evaluative other present and/or videotaping 
for later evaluation - DeCaro, et al., 2011; 
Gimmig et al., 2006). Monitoring pressure, in 
contrast, is more likely to encourage self-
monitoring of task performance than to co-opt 
working memory and attentional resources, 
resulting in impairment in cognitive tasks 
dependent on procedural knowledge 
(DeCaro, et al., 2011). Consistent with these 
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predictions, outcome pressure has been 
shown to impair performance on cognitive 
tasks dependent on working memory, and 
monitoring pressure impairs performance on 
more procedural cognitive tasks (e.g. Decaro, 
et al., 2011). Importantly, however, many 
pressure situations are multifaceted including 
both aspects of outcome and monitoring 
pressure. Such combined pressure situations 
have been argued to negatively impact 
performance on both working-memory 
dependent and procedural-knowledge 
dependent tasks, although this prediction has 
yet to be tested (DeCaro, et al., 2011).  
 
What is Stress? 
As with pressure, stress is a multifaceted 
construct. Variability exists in individual 
responses to potential stressors (i.e. events, 
situations). Individuals experience more 
distress when the perceived demands of a 
situation exceed their resources to cope (e.g. 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1994). Higher levels of 
distress are marked by the psychological 
experience of threat, and activation of both 
the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and 
the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis (HPA) 
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Dienstbier, 
1989; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lupien et 
al., 2007; McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995). When, 
however, individuals perceive adequate 
resources to cope with the demands of the 
situation, they may experience less distress 
(e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
Stressors that exhibit the most robust 
stress responses in the lab involve 
performance situations in which individuals 
are evaluated by others in a domain of 
personal importance, and in which they are 
motivated to do well (Blascovich & Tomaka, 
1996; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Such 
social-evaluative stressors share elements of 
both outcome pressure and monitoring 
pressure and, like pressure, have been 
shown to impair cognitive performance 
depending upon an individual’s stress 
response (Ell, et al., 2011; Kassam et al., 
2009; Payne et al., 2007). While a distress 
response is commonly associated with 
negative cognitive task performance, it may 
facilitate performance on more procedural 
cognitive tasks that are less dependent on 
working memory and attentional resources 
(e.g. Ell, et al., 2011). For example, distress 
has been shown to impair working memory 
and attentional control (e.g., Plessow et al., 
2012; Schoofs et al., 2008) but also to bias 
processing toward procedural knowledge 
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2012). These effects may 
be due in part to the “neuro-symphony” of 
neurotransmitters and stress steroids 
released in the stress response (e.g. 
norepinephrine and cortisol; Joels & Baram, 
2009). In contrast to pressure research in 
which it is the variability in the pressure 
situation (outcome, monitoring, combined) 
that is argued to be of critical import to 
understanding the consequences of pressure 
for cognition, the consequences of a stressor 
on cognition have been argued to depend 
critically on variability in the stress response.  
 
The Current Investigation: Is Pressure 
Stressful? 
Many manipulations intended to increase 
pressure, particularly monitoring pressure 
manipulations, include characteristics that 
might be expected to lead to a stress 
response. Indeed, the words pressure and 
stress are sometimes used interchangeably in 
the literature (e.g., Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; 
DeCaro, et al., 2011; Staal, 2004). We 
propose that integrating the pressure-
cognition and stress-cognition literatures may 
require consideration of the type of pressure, 
the stress response, and the cognitive system 
mediating task performance. 
As a model task, we focus on category 
learning (i.e. the process of establishing a 
memory trace that improves the efficiency of 
assigning novel objects to different groups). 
Category learning has attracted the interest of 
both pressure-cognition researchers (DeCaro, 
et al., 2011; Markman, et al., 2006; Worthy et 
al., 2009) and stress-cognition researchers 
(Ell, et al., 2011; Schwabe & Wolf, 2012), 
making it a particularly useful paradigm given 
our goals. Moreover, there is extensive 
evidence suggesting that processing can be 
biased towards different cognitive systems by 
STRESS, PRESSURE, AND COGNITION 
the categorization response) is 
assessed (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). In 
particular, we focus on the rule-based 
(RB) and information-integration (II) 
tasks plotted in Figure 1. RB and II 
tasks are argued to be probes for 
different category learning systems 
that compete and vary in their 
dependence on working memory and 
attentional resources (with RB tasks 
being more dependent - Ashby et al., 
1998; Ashby & Ell, 2001; Ashby & 
Maddox, 2005; but see Lewandowsky 
et al., 2012). For example, Markman 
and colleagues (Markman, et al., 
2006) trained participants on the 
Figure 1 tasks under low (i.e., participants 
were instructed to do their best) or high 
outcome pressure (i.e., participants were led 
to believe that their performance would 
determine if they, and a fictitious partner, 
would earn a monetary bonus). Consistent 
with the aforementioned research suggesting 
that outcome pressure co-opts working 
memory and attentional resources, and the 
assumption of competition between category 
learning systems, high outcome pressure 
impaired performance on the RB task and 
enhanced performance on the II task.  
DeCaro and colleagues (DeCaro et al., 
2011) extended this work and tested the 
hypothesis that the effect of pressure on 
performance in these cognitive tasks is also 
dependent on the type of pressure. Using a 
different set of RB and II tasks (i.e., stimuli 
varying along 4, binary-valued dimensions), 
DeCaro and colleagues (2011) replicated the 
impairing effect of outcome pressure on an 
RB task, but observed no effect of outcome 
pressure on an II task. Monitoring pressure, in 
contrast, is argued to impair procedural tasks 
– tasks that are thought to be more sensitive 
to the effects of self-awareness and self-
monitoring. Consistent with this pressure-type 
hypothesis, DeCaro and colleagues found 
that monitoring pressure impaired 
performance on an II, and not an RB, task. 
Although combined pressure, or pressure that 
contains elements of both outcome and 
monitoring pressure, was not investigated, 
DeCaro and colleagues argued that combined 
pressure would negatively impact 
performance in both RB and II tasks 
Ell and colleagues (Ell et al. 2011) 
investigated the impact of a social-evaluative 
stressor on the subsequent performance in 
the RB and II tasks depicted in Figure 1. The 
social-evaluative stressor was adapted from 
the classic Trier Social Stress Test (TSST, 
Kirschbaum et al., 1993) which contains 
strong elements of both outcome and 
monitoring pressure (in addition to uncertainty 
and ego relevance elements). In contrast to 
the pressure manipulations described above, 
and in common with many investigations of 
the role of stress in cognition, this stressor 
occurred prior to the learning tasks (offline) 
and was not directly relevant to task 
performance yet participants’ stress remained 
elevated into the learning period. Ell et al. 
(2011) found that increased distress 
enhanced performance on the II task and 
tended to decrease (although not 
significantly) performance on the RB task. 
Moreover, distress was associated with 
increased use of a task appropriate II decision 
strategy in the II task suggesting a bias away 
from rule-guided behavior. 
Thus, RB and II categorization tasks have 
been studied in the context of both pressure 
and stress and have yielded mixed results, 
particularly for performance in II tasks. To 
begin to integrate the pressure-cognition and 
stress-cognition literatures in this area it is 
first necessary to answer the basic question 
of whether pressure is stressful. In two 
Figure 1. Scatterplots of the stimuli from the rule-based 
and information-integration tasks. The unfilled circles 
represent category A stimuli, the filled circles represent 
category B stimuli, and the solid lines are the optimal 
decision boundaries. 
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experiments, we test the basic question of 
whether pressure is experienced as stressful 
(Experiment 1, outcome pressure; Experiment 
2, combined pressure), and the 
consequences of this pressure for 




In Experiment 1, we replicated Markman et al. 
(2006) while recording markers of the stress 
response (i.e. distress appraisals, heart rate, 
blood pressure). We first examined whether 
the outcome pressure manipulation was 
experienced by participants as stressful. We 
then tested the hypothesis that outcome 
pressure would impair performance in the RB 
task and not impair performance on the II task 
(due to absence of monitoring pressure; 
DeCaro et al., 2011) or even enhance 
performance on the II task (due to 
competition; Markman, et al., 2006). Finally, a 
stress-variability perspective (Ell et al, 2011) 
would predict enhancement of II only to the 
extent that outcome pressure is distressing.  
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Undergraduates (N = 116) with normal 
(20/20) or corrected to normal vision 
participated in a one hour session in 
exchange for course credit. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions (RB-low pressure = 
23; RB-high pressure = 36; II-low pressure = 
20; II-high pressure = 35). One participant 
was excluded from the RB-low pressure 
condition because they used only one 
response key throughout the experiment.  
Task and Procedure. 
All methods and procedures specific to the 
category learning tasks replicated Markman, 
et al. (2006) with one exception. As the 
impairing/enhancing effects of outcome 
pressure were evident across the initial 5 
blocks in Markman et al., participants were 
trained on either the RB or II task for only 5, 
instead of 8, blocks of 80 trials. The stimuli 
were sine-wave gratings weighted by a 
circular Gaussian filter that varied across trials 
in spatial frequency (cycles/degree of visual 
angle) and orientation (degrees of rotation 
counterclockwise from horizontal). On each 
trial, a single stimulus was presented and the 
participant was instructed to make a category 
assignment by pressing one of two response 
keys (labeled “A” or “B”) with the index and 
middle fingers of their dominant hand (blood 
pressure measurements were taken from their 
non-dominant arm). There was no time limit 
for response and corrective feedback was 
provided immediately after each response 
(i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”). Two points were 
added to a point meter on the monitor 
following correct responses, but there was no 
change in points following incorrect 
responses. The stimuli were generated and 
presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) for 
MATLAB. The stimuli were displayed on a 17” 
LCD with 1280 × 1024 resolution in a dimly lit 
room. 
Participants in the low outcome pressure 
condition were instructed to do their best. 
Participants in the high outcome pressure 
condition were instructed that they and a 
(fictional) partner would receive a monetary 
bonus if they both exceeded a performance 
criterion of 128 points (i.e., 80% correct) at 
the end of training and that their partner had 
met this criterion. Thus, earning the monetary 
bonus depended solely on the participant’s 
performance. Participants were reminded of 
these instructions at the beginning of the final 
block. The performance criterion (128 points) 
was indicated by a line on the point meter. 
 
Distress Appraisal.  
Following the task, participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which they found the task 
stressful, demanding, effortful, and distressing 
on a 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much) scale. The 
responses were averaged to form a reliable 
index of distress (  = .82). 
Physical Reactivity.  
Upon arrival, sensors to monitor 
cardiovascular and hemodynamic reactivity 
were applied (ECG: electrocardiogram, BP: 
STRESS, PRESSURE, AND COGNITION 
continual blood pressure). Participants then 
relaxed for a 5 min baseline. HR and MAP 
were recorded using BioPac MP150 hardware 
and BioPac Acquire software. Data were  
 
ensemble averaged over relevant minutes 
using Mindware software. We calculated 
average heart rate (HR, beats per minute) 
and mean arterial pressure            
                          
 
  during baseline (last 2 
min, most relaxed) and the final block of trials 
(first 2 min, highest pressure)1. As earning the 
                                                            
1
  We focus on the first 2 min of the final block to equate the 
time interval used for baseline measurements and because 
monetary bonus was contingent upon 
performance during the final block, pressure 
would be expected to be at its peak during the 
beginning of this block. Reactivity scores were 
computed by subtracting baseline from this 
peak level. Thus, positive/negative numbers 
indicate a rise/decline in HR or MAP.  
Results 
Is Outcome Pressure Stressful? 
Distress Appraisals Participants did not find 
the outcome pressure particularly distressing 
as all participants reported levels well below 
the midpoint of the scale (High pressure: MRB 
= 2.10, SDRB = 1.26, MII = 1.26, SDII = 1.10; 
Low pressure: MRB= 2.07, SDRB = .91, MII = 
1.26, SDII = 1.10). Further, a 2(task) by 
2(pressure) ANOVA revealed no effect of 
outcome pressure on distress (F(1,106) = 
2.62, p = .11, p
2 = .02) nor an interaction, 
F(1,106) = 2.15, p = .12, p
2 = .03. There was 
an effect of task with participants rating the 
RB task slightly more distressing than the II 
task, F(1,106) = 4.18, p = .04, p
2 = .04. 
Physiological Reactivity Consistent with the 
low levels of distress, participants did not 
evidence physical reactivity to outcome 
pressure (see Figure 2). Importantly, there 
were no significant differences by pressure 
condition in baseline HR (all Fs < 1, ps > .40) 
or baseline MAP (all Fs < 2.34, ps >.13). No 
effects of pressure condition, task or the 
interaction were observed for HR reactivity (all 
Fs < 1.20, all ps > .27). Although there was a 
significant effect of pressure condition on 
MAP reactivity F(1,86) = 7.12, p < .05, p
2 = 
.08), this effect was not a result of increased 
MAP in the high pressure condition (see 
Figure 2). No other effects were observed for 
MAP (Fs < .30, ps > .55)2.  
 
                                                                                             
cardiovascular responses recover relatively quickly from stress 
(Linden et al., 1997). 
 
2 Note that the degrees of freedom for our physiological 
measures fluctuate slightly as a result of missing or unscorable 
data due to equipment issues (RB-low pressure = 4; RB-high 
pressure = 6; II-low pressure = 2; II-high pressure = 6). 
Figure 2. Average physiological 
reactivity at the beginning of the final 
block during Experiment 1 for HR 
(heart rate: beats/minute) and MAP 
(mean arterial pressure: mm Hg) as 
a function of the categorization task 
and pressure condition. 
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Figure 3. Average accuracy across blocks in 
Experiment 1 as a function of the 
categorization task and pressure condition. 
Does Outcome Pressure Impair Cognitive 
Performance?  
Accuracy Analyses Consistent with 
predictions, outcome pressure significantly 
impaired accuracy in the RB task (see Figure 
3). We examined the effect of pressure by 
block separately for each task condition (with 
block as the within-subjects factor, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected for violation of 
sphericity). As is evident in Figure 3, 
participants in all conditions improved in 
accuracy over blocks (RB block: 
F(2.65,148.55) = 39.92, p <.05, p
2 = .42; II 
block: F(3.10,164.06) = 30.98, p < .05, p
2 = 
.01).  
Outcome pressure only negatively 
impacted performance in the RB task (RB 
pressure: F(1,56) = 5.96, p < .05, p
2 = .10; II 
pressure: F(1,53) = .69, p = .41, p
2 = .01) 
and this effect was consistent across blocks 
(RB block x pressure: F(2.65, 148.55) = .65, p 
= .57, p
2 = .01; II block x pressure: 
F(3.10,164.06), p = .71, p
2 = .01). Consistent 
with a pressure-type perspective, (DeCaro et 
al., 2011) performance on the II task was not 
impaired. There was no evidence of 
enhancement of II performance in the high 
outcome pressure condition.  
 
Model-Based Analyses Analysis of the 
accuracy data does not directly address the 
question of what decision strategies were 
used to perform the categorization tasks. For 
instance, does the impairment in the RB task 
reflect a shift to a less optimal decision 
strategy or an increase in guessing? The 
following analysis represents a quantitative 
approach to investigating these questions. 
Three different types of models were 
evaluated, each based on a different 
assumption concerning the participant's 
strategy. Rule-based models assume that the 
participant sets decision criteria on one (or 
both) stimulus dimensions (e.g., if the bars 
are wide, respond A; otherwise respond B). 
Information-integration models assume that 
the participant integrates the stimulus 
information from both dimensions prior to 
making a categorization decision. Finally, 
random responder models assume that the 
participant guessed. Each of these models 
was fit separately to the data from every 
response block for all participants using a 
standard maximum likelihood procedure for 
parameter estimation (Ashby, 1992b; 
Wickens, 1982) and the Bayes information 
criterion for goodness-of-fit (Schwarz, 1978) 
(see Appendix A for a more detailed 
description of the models and fitting 
procedure).  
For brevity, we focus on the results from 
the final block (Table 1). In the RB task, there 
was a reduction in the dominance of RB 
strategies (and increase in guessing) in the 
high pressure condition, but this shift in the 
distribution of best-fitting models was not 
significant [χ2 (2) = 2.49, p = .29]. 
Nevertheless, the increase in guessing likely 
contributed to the reduced accuracy in the 
RB-high pressure condition as the subset of 
participants best fit by RR models (M = 55.83, 
SD = 4.42) performed much worse than those 
best fit by RB models (M = 82.14, SD = 6.85) 
or II models (M = 76.67, SD = 6.88). In the II 
task, pressure had little effect on the 
distribution of best fitting strategies [χ2 (2) = 
.51, p = .78]. In sum, pressure was neither 
psychologically nor physiologically stressful, 
but consistent with previous work, pressure 
impaired performance on a RB task.  
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Table 1. Proportion of participants best fit by each model type during the final block 
 Model Type   
Condition RB II RR 
 







RB: High Outcome Pressure .67 .08 .25 
 







II: High Outcome Pressure .31 .51 .17 
Note. RB – rule based; II – information integration; RR – random responder. The II: 
High Pressure data do not sum to 1 due to rounding error. 
Discussion 
Our data suggest that the answer to the basic 
question of whether outcome pressure is 
stressful is: No. At the group level, 
participants did not find outcome pressure to 
be psychologically or physiologically 
distressing. Consistent with DeCaro and 
colleagues (2011), outcome pressure 
impaired performance in the RB task and did 
not impair performance in the II task. 
Collectively, these data are most consistent 
with the hypothesis that outcome pressure co-
opts working memory and attentional 
resources, leading to selective impairment in 
the RB task. It may be the case that higher 
levels of distress are required to evidence the 
enhancement of II performance demonstrated 
by Ell et al. (2011) Thus, in Experiment 2 we 
augment our outcome pressure with 
monitoring pressure in an effort to increase 
distress and to test the hypotheses for 
combined pressure set forth by DeCaro et al. 
(2011) (i.e. impairment in both II and RB 
tasks). 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested predictions 
regarding the consequences of combined 
pressure for stress reactivity and cognitive 
performance. To create our combined 
pressure condition, we augmented the 
outcome pressure manipulation from 
Markman et al. (2006) with monitoring 
pressure by adding elements of social 
evaluation. Social evaluation is a key 
component of many classic stress 
manipulations (see Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004 for a review) and may lead to greater 
stress reactivity than outcome pressure alone. 
In addition we examined the theoretical 
predictions from DeCaro et al. (2011) that 
combined pressure would impair performance 
on both RB and II tasks. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Undergraduates (N =103; normal or corrected 
to normal vision) participating for course credit 
were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions (RB, low pressure = 
28; RB, high combined pressure = 26; II, low 
pressure = 23; II, high combined pressure = 
26). 3 
                                                            
3 Due to equipment and computer issues we have missing data 
for both the categorization task (II-low pressure = 1; II-high 
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Task and Procedure  
The tasks and procedure were identical to 
Experiment 1 with the exception that 
participants in the high combined pressure 
condition experienced monitoring pressure in 
addition to outcome pressure. To subtly 
heighten social evaluation, participants 
engaged in a brief interaction over an 
intercom with the fictional partner. Following 
the task instructions, participants introduced 
                                                                                             
pressure = 1), and the physiological markers (RB-low pressure 
= 1; RB-high pressure = 1; II-high pressure = 1).  
 
themselves to their partner over an intercom. 
The partner then stated, “I did meet the 
criterion, so it is all up to you…good luck.” 
The experimenter reinforced the social 
evaluation of the partner by stating, 
“Remember, you will have a chance to 
discuss your performance with your partner 
afterward” (see Appendix B for the full script). 
Participants in the low pressure condition 
were simply asked to do their best. Physical 
reactivity and distress appraisals (  = .78) 
were measured as described in Experiment 1.  
Results 
Is Combined Pressure Stressful? 
Distress Appraisal While participants in the 
high combined pressure condition (Mhigh = 
2.29, SDhigh = 1.23) reported significantly 
higher distress appraisals than participants in 
the low pressure condition (Mlow = 1.71, SDlow 
= 1.23; F(1,98) = 5.82, p < .05, p
2 = .06), it 
should be noted that as in Experiment 1, 
distress remained below the midpoint of the 
scale. We observed no effect of task (F(1,98) 
= 1.23, p = .27, p
2 = .01) nor of the 
interaction (F(1,98) = 3.34, p = .07, p
2 = .03). 
Physiological Reactivity Adding the subtle 
manipulation of monitoring pressure to the 
outcome pressure from Experiment 1 resulted 
in a modest, but significant, increase in HR 
and MAP relative to both baseline and the low 
pressure condition (see Figure 4). Importantly, 
no significant differences in MAP or HR were 
observed at baseline, although the effect of 
pressure condition approached significance 
for HR (F(1, 85) = 3.33, p = .07, p
2 = .04; all 
other Fs < 1.54, ps > .21).  
The addition of monitoring pressure to the 
outcome pressure used in Experiment 1 
resulted in significant main effects of pressure 
for both HR reactivity (F(1, 85) = 13.18, p < 
.05, p
2 = .13) and MAP reactivity (F(1, 84) = 
9.34, p < .05, p
2 = .10). Moreover, the 
modest increase in HR and MAP observed in 
the combined pressure conditions was 
significantly different from baseline (0; HR: t 
(42) = 6.34, p < .05, d = 1.96; MAP: t (43) = 
6.44, p < .05, d =1.96). While the interaction 
approached significance for MAP (F(1, 84) =  
Figure 4. Average physiological 
reactivity at the beginning of the final 
block during Experiment 2 for HR (heart 
rate: beats/minute) and MAP (mean 
arterial pressure: mm Hg) as a function 
of the categorization task and pressure 
condition. 
STRESS, PRESSURE, AND COGNITION 
Figure 5. Average accuracy across blocks 
in Experiment 2 as a function of the 
categorization task and pressure condition. 
 
Table 2. Proportion of participants best fit by each model type during the final block 
 Model Type   
Condition RB II RR 
 







RB: High Combined Pressure .62 .12 .27 
 







II: High Combined Pressure .40 .20 .40 
Note. RB – rule based; II – information integration; RR – random responder. The 
RB: Combined Pressure data do not sum to 1 due to rounding error. 
 
3.69, p = .06, p
2 = .04), no significant effect of 
task, or moderation by task, was observed (Fs 
< 2.14, ps > .14). Thus, adding a subtle 
manipulation of monitoring pressure to the 
outcome pressure from Experiment 1 resulted 
in a modest, but significant, increase in HR 
and MAP relative to both baseline and low 
pressure. 
 
Does Outcome Pressure Impair Cognitive 
Performance?  
Accuracy Analyses Consistent with 
predictions from DeCaro et al. (2011), 
combined pressure impaired performance on 
both the RB and II tasks (see Figure 5). As in 
Experiment 1, participants in all conditions 
improved their accuracy over blocks (RB: 
F(2.88, 149.73) = 50.79, p <.05, p
2 = .49; II 
F(3.27, 147.31) = 24.02, p <.05, p
2 = .35). 
Participants under high combined pressure 
evidenced significantly lower performance in 
the RB (F(1,52) = 4.84, p < .05, p
2 = .09) and 
II tasks (F(1,45) = 8.36, p < .05, p
2 = .16) 
relative to the low pressure condition; and 
these effects were not moderated by block 
(RB: F(2.88, 149.73) = .59, p = .68, p
2 = 
.009; II: F(3.27, 147.31) = 1.08, p = .36, p
2 = 
.02).   
Model-Based Analyses In order to investigate 
any differences in the decision strategies 
used by participants, the models described in 
Experiment 1 were also fit to these data. For 
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brevity, we focus on the results from the final 
block (Table 2). In both tasks, there was an 
increase in the dominance of guessing 
models in the combined pressure condition. 
Although the difference in the distribution of 
best fitting models between pressure 
conditions was statistically significant in only 
the II task [RB: χ2 (2) = 1.42, p = .49; II: χ2 (2) 
= 9.46, p < .05], the increase in guessing 
likely contributed to the pressure impairment 
in both tasks as the subset of participants 
best fit by RR models (MRB task = 52.68, SDRB 
task = 3.78; MII task = 53.75, SDII task = 5.59) 
performed much worse than those best fit by 
RB models (MRB task = 81.48, SDRB task = 8.96 
or II models (MII task = 70.25, SDII task = 3.47).  
Is Distress Associated with Cognitive 
Performance at These More Modest Levels?  
Previous work has demonstrated 
enhancement of performance in an II task 
with higher levels of distress (Ell, et al., 2011). 
As shown in Figure 6, the stress reactivity in 
the combined pressure condition of 
Experiment 2 is orders of magnitude lower 
than that observed in the social- evaluative 
stressor used by Ell et al. at peak stress (i.e., 
a modified version of the TSST; reactivity 
continued into the learning period in Ell et al.) 
4.  
It is important to note, however, that 
although all participants faced the same 
social evaluative stressor in Ell et al., there 
was considerable individual variability in 
stress reactivity. The more distress 
participant’s evidenced, the higher their II 
performance and the lower their RB 
performance (although the RB effects were 
not significant). Thus, while there may be 
mean differences in reactivity by pressure 
condition in Experiment 2, we would not 
expect the relationship between reactivity and 
cognitive performance to differ by pressure 
condition or Experiment. Accordingly, we 
                                                            
4 As expected, physiological reactivity varied across the three 
experiments plotted in Figure 6 for both physiological variables 
[HR: F(2,130) = 47.65, p < .05, p
2
 = .42; MAP: F(2,132) = 
202.95, p < .05, p
2
 = .26]. In general, post hoc analyses 
(Student-Newman-Keuls) indicated that physiological reactivity 
was ordered from highest-to-lowest as described in Figure 6 
(p’s < .05) with the one exception being the HR difference for 
the present experiments (p = .06).  
examined the relationships between distress 
(appraisals, HR reactivity, and MAP reactivity) 
and cognitive performance within each task 
condition collapsed across condition and 
experiment5.   
While the level of distress in the current 
studies was more modest than observed in Ell 
et al., the more distress participants reported 
the lower their accuracy in the RB task (r(110) 
= -.47, p < .001) but not the II task (r(100) = -
.15, p = .17). This impairment effect was 
replicated when examining the point biserial 
correlation between task appropriate strategy 
use (appropriate vs. inappropriate; see 
Appendix A) and reported distress. The more 
distress participants reported, the less likely 
participants were to use task appropriate rule 
based strategies in the RB task (r(110) = -.42, 
p <.001). In contrast, distress did not predict 
appropriate use of II strategies in the II task, 
r(100) = -.04, p = .67. Consistent with the 
perspective that distress may enhance II 
performance, even at this modest level of 
distress higher heart rate reactivity was 
associated with better accuracy in the II task 
(r(86) = .29, p < .01) but not the RB task (r(91) 
= .16, p = .13). This pattern of enhancement 
in the II task was also evident in the 
association between heart rate reactivity and 
the use of task appropriate strategies (rII(86) = 
.25, p < .05; rRB(91) = .02, p = .88). No effects 
were observed for blood pressure reactivity at 
these modest levels of distress (Accuracy: 
rII(83) = .06, p =.57; rRB(93) = .16, p = .11; 
Appropriate Strategy Use: rII(83) = .15, p =.17; 
rRB(93) = .02, p = .85).  
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we added monitoring 
pressure to the outcome pressure 
manipulation used by Markman et al., 2006. 
The addition of social evaluation did indeed 
raise the intensity of the stress response. 
                                                            
5 We first used moderated regression to examine whether the 
effects of distress on performance within each task were 
moderated by experiment and pressure condition. They were 
not. All relevant interaction terms [e.g. Distress Marker 
(centered at the mean) X Task (0 = II) X Experiment (0 = 
Experiment 1)  X Pressure Condition (0 = low pressure)] were 
not significant using either accuracy or strategy use as an 
outcome variable and heart rate, appraisals, or blood pressure 
as the distress marker. 
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While more modest than the stress response 
observed in Ell et al. (2011; see Figure 6), 
participants did perceive the combined 
pressure as more distressing and reported 
higher HR and MAP reactivity relative to the 
control condition.  Consistent with the 
theorizing of DeCaro and colleagues (2011), 
combined pressure impaired both RB and II 
tasks relative to the control condition. The 
addition of monitoring pressure to the 
outcome manipulation from Experiment 1 led 
to an impairment of II performance that was 
not evident with outcome pressure alone. 
Model based analyses suggest that this 
impairment may be due to an increase in 
random responding in the II task under 
combined pressure.   
We also found mixed evidence for the 
relationships between distress and task 
performance at these modest levels of stress 
reactivity. As hypothesized, accuracy and 
appropriate strategy use in RB tasks were 
impaired by distress – but only self-reported 
distress. In contrast, accuracy and 
appropriate strategy use in II tasks were 
enhanced by distress – but only as marked by 
heart rate reactivity. 
 
General Discussion 
The current research represents a modest 
first step toward integrating the pressure-
cognition and stress-cognition literatures. We 
believe the concepts of pressure, stress and 
cognition to be multifaceted. When examining 
the effects of a stressor on cognitive 
performance it is important to consider the 
type of pressure exerted (outcome, 
monitoring, or combined), stress reactivity and 
the cognitive system mediating task 
performance. As an initial step toward 
examining these broader questions, we first 
addressed the basic question of whether 
pressure is indeed stressful. Across two 
experiments, we examined the stress 
response to common pressure manipulations, 
and the consequences for categorization 
tasks thought to depend on different learning 
systems. 
Is Pressure Stressful? 
In Experiment 1, we found that outcome 
pressure was not experienced by participants 
as stressful. This is particularly important for 
future attempts at reconciling stress-cognition 
and pressure-cognition findings as the terms 
“stress” and “pressure” are often conflated in 
the literature. In Experiment 2, the addition of 
a very subtle manipulation of social evaluation 
increased monitoring pressure and resulted in 
significant, but modest, stress reactivity to this 
combined pressure. Participants reported 
significantly higher heart rate reactivity, blood 
pressure reactivity and distress appraisals in 
the combined pressure condition relative to 
the low pressure condition. As noted in 
Figure6, however, this stress response was 
substantially lower than that observed by Ell 
et al. (2011). As we work toward integrating 
the stress cognition and pressure cognition 
literatures, it may be important to distinguish 
when, and to what degree, pressure is 
experienced as distressing. 
Does Pressure Impair Cognitive 
Performance? 
Consistent with the findings from DeCaro et 
al. (2011) and Markman et al. (2006), 
outcome pressure and combined pressure 
impaired performance on the category 
learning task thought to be more dependent 
upon working memory and attentional 
resources (i.e., a RB task). These data are 
consistent with the hypothesis that outcome 
pressure serves as a distraction/divides 
attention, impairing performance on tasks 
dependent on working memory. Indeed, this 
may explain why participants tended to 
engage in more random responding in the RB 
task in the high pressure conditions relative to 
the no pressure conditions, although this 
effect was not significant in either study.  
Our findings for the effects of pressure on 
II task performance were consistent with the
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theorizing and findings of DeCaro et al., 2011. 
Outcome pressure did not impair performance 
on a more procedural-based category 
learning task (i.e., an II task). Combined 
pressure, in contrast, led to impairments in 
accuracy and more random responding in the 
II task relative to the control condition, 
arguably due to increased self awareness 
resulting from monitoring (DeCaro et al., 
2011).  
We did not find that outcome pressure 
enhanced II performance, contrary to the 
findings of Markman et al (2006). As the 
prominent theoretical perspective on the 
learning of RB and II tasks (Ashby, et al., 
1998) does not distinguish between types of 
pressure, the consequences of adding 
monitoring pressure (combined pressure) to 
the predictions of Markman et al are unclear. 
If adding monitoring pressure is perceived as 
simply increasing the intensity of the 
pressure, perhaps enhancement on the II task 
might have been expected. There is no easy 
explanation for our failure to replicate the 
enhancement observed by Markman et al. 
Perhaps the participants in Markman et al. 
found the outcome pressure more distressing 
than our participants (i.e. higher levels of 
distress may be associated with 
enhancement of II; Ell et. al., 2011).  
 
Distress and Cognitive Performance: More 
Questions than Answers? 
 
How do the current findings relate to those 
observed by Ell and colleagues (2011)? Ell 
and colleagues found that distress enhanced 
performance on an II task. For both accuracy 
and appropriate strategy use, the higher 
participants distress (i.e. appraisals, total 
peripheral resistance, cardiac output) the 
better their II performance. We did not 
observe enhanced II performance in the only 
condition that evidenced significant stress 
reactivity above baseline: combined pressure. 
Yet, from the stress-variability perspective of 
Ell et al., individuals vary in their response to 
pressure and it is those that respond with 
higher levels of distress (regardless of 
pressure condition) that may evidence 














































Accordingly, we analyzed the associations 
between our markers of stress reactivity and 
task performance collapsed across condition 
and experiment. Our results were mixed. 
Consistent with the findings that Ell et al. 
observed with different distress markers, 
Figure 6. Average physiological 
reactivity and distress appraisals 
from the high pressure conditions 
(averaged across tasks) of 
Experiment 1 (E1), Experiment 2 
(E2) and the final two min. of a 
modified version of the TSST that 
was administered in Ell et al. (2011). 
HR (heart rate: beats per minute) 
and MAP (mean arterial pressure: 
mm Hg).  
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higher levels of heart rate reactivity were 
associated with greater accuracy, as well as, 
more appropriate strategy use in the II task 
but not in the RB task. It is particularly 
intriguing to observe this association at these 
lower levels of stress reactivity when behavior 
is often unassociated with reactivity (Lupien, 
et al., 2007; Roozendaal, 2002). Indeed, II 
and RB task performance were unassociated 
with blood pressure reactivity. In contrast to 
the physical distress variable predictive of II 
performance, RB performance was related to 
the self-report marker of distress. The more 
participants reported feeling that the task was 
stressful, effortful, demanding and distressing 
the lower their accuracy and appropriate 
strategy use in the RB task. Self-reported 
distress was unrelated to performance in the 
II task.  
Reconciling the current mixed findings 
with Ell et al is further complicated by 
differences in the levels of participants’ stress 
reactivity.  While distress rose with the 
addition of monitoring pressure in Experiment 
2, as can be seen in Figure 6 distress 
reactivity was more modest than that 
observed in Ell et al. In addition to aspects of 
outcome and monitoring pressure the TSST 
incorporates a number of other factors that 
are associated with a more robust stress 
response (e.g., uncontrollability - Dickerson & 
Kemeny, 2004). Further the TSST is a 20 min 
social evaluative stressor developed to 
activate the Hypothalimic Pituitary Adrenal 
Axis (HPA) and measurable increases in 
cortisol (Kirschbaum, et al., 1993). Although 
combined pressure resulted in significant 
increases for both MAP and HR (relative to 
baseline), these effects were relatively 
modest when compared to those observed 
with the TSST. Thus, it may be that consistent 
associations between stress reactivity and 
task performance are more evident with 
higher levels of reactivity.  
Yet, while the mixed findings between 
distress reactivity and performance could be 
due to the lower intensity of the response, 
there are other important factors to consider. 
Our analyses assume a linear relationship 
between distress and cognitive performance. 
It is conceivable that this relationship could 
vary across levels of distress. Certainly the 
“neuro-symphony” (Joels & Baram, 2009) of 
the stress response is likely to vary (e.g. 
cortisol more evident at higher levels of 
intensity). A broader representation of data 
across the continuum of the stress response 
would help clarify whether the relationship 
between distress and cognitive performance 
in the RB and II tasks is non-linear.  
In addition, there is considerable 
methodological diversity in the way in which 
pressure has been implemented in the 
laboratory setting. Some researchers have 
simply used time pressure or performance 
bonuses whereas others have incorporated a 
social-evaluative component (see Staal, 2004 
for a review). In addition, pressure 
manipulations are typically administered 
online (i.e., the pressure manipulation and 
task are concurrent) and often the 
manipulation is directly relevant to the task at 
hand (i.e., partner’s bonus contingent on 
participant’s performance). This stands in 
contrast to the majority of stress-cognition 
research that uses offline stressors (i.e., the 
stressor precedes the task but reactivity may 
remain high during the task as in Ell et al., 
2011), stressors unrelated to the cognitive 
task (e.g., cold pressor; Smeets et al., 2008), 
and/or more intense prolonged stressors 
known to activate a cortisol response (i.e. 
TSST). These differences in method may 
stem from differences in the proposed 
mediators of the role of pressure and stress in 
cognitive performance. Much of the pressure 
literature posits cognitive explanations while 
in contrast much of the stress literature posits 
more biological ones. Our findings may raise 
more questions than answers – but they are 
important questions for future work integrating 
the stress cognition and pressure cognition 
literatures.  Our data suggest that research 
examining factors related to the intensity, task 
relevance, type (outcome, monitoring, 
combined), and timing (online vs. offline) of 
stressors/pressure manipulations is needed.  
 
Conclusions 
The goal of this research was to take an initial 
modest step towards integrating the pressure-
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cognition and stress-cognition literatures. 
While the terms pressure and stress are often 
used interchangeably in the literature, our 
data suggest that there are important 
distinctions: Pressure is not always stressful. 
Our findings regarding task performance 
support the hypotheses of DeCaro et al. 
demonstrating that differentiating pressure 
type may be important for understanding the 
relationship between pressure and 
performance in cognitive tasks dependent on 
different learning systems. Outcome pressure 
is assumed to impact cognitive performance 
by co-opting working memory and attentional 
resources thereby impairing performance on 
tasks dependent upon executive control 
processes. Monitoring pressure, in contrast, is 
assumed to increase awareness of the sub-
components of tasks thereby impairing 
performance on more procedural tasks. In our 
experiments, outcome pressure selectively 
impaired performance on the RB task, while 
the addition of monitoring pressure led to 
impairment in both RB and II tasks. This latter 
finding is novel and contributes to our 
understanding of the role of combined 
pressure in cognitive performance. These 
data also contribute to the growing 
appreciation in both the stress-cognition and 
pressure-cognition literatures of distinguishing 
the cognitive system mediating task 
performance when considering the 
consequences of pressure or stress. While 
our findings for the role of distress in cognitive 
performance were less clear at the low levels 
of reactivity observed, including the 
measurement of the physiological stress 
response in future studies of the pressure-
cognition relationship will be critical in 
elucidating this relationship given the possible 
interplay between stress-response variability 
and the cognitive systems mediating task 
performance.  
Appendix A: Model-Based Analyses 
To get a more detailed description of how 
participants categorized the stimuli, a number 
of different decision bound models (Ashby, 
1992a; Maddox & Ashby, 1993) were fit 
separately to the data for each participant 
from every block. Decision bound models are 
derived from general recognition theory 
(Ashby & Townsend, 1986), a multivariate 
generalization of signal detection theory 
(Green & Swets, 1966). It is assumed that, on 
each trial, the percept can be represented as 
a point in a multidimensional psychological 
space and that each participant constructs a 
decision bound to partition the perceptual 
space into response regions. The participant 
determines which region the percept is in, and 
then makes the corresponding response. 
While this decision strategy is deterministic, 
decision bound models predict probabilistic 
responding because of trial-by-trial perceptual 
and criterial noise (Ashby & Lee, 1993). 
The appendix briefly describes the 
decision bound models. For more details, see 
Ashby (1992a) or Maddox and Ashby (1993). 
The classification of these models as either 
rule-based or information-integration models 
is designed to reflect current theories of how 
these strategies are learned (e.g., Ashby, et 
al., 1998) and has received considerable 
empirical support (see Ashby & Maddox, 
2005; Maddox & Ashby, 2004 for reviews).  
 
Rule-Based Models 
Unidimensional Classifier (UC) This model 
assumes that the stimulus space is 
partitioned into two regions by setting a 
criterion on one of the stimulus dimensions. 
Two versions of the UC were fit to these data. 
One version assumes that participants 
attended selectively to spatial frequency and 
the other version assumes participants 
attended selectively to orientation. The UC 
has two free parameters, one corresponds to 
the decision criterion on the attended 
dimension and the other corresponds to the 
variance of internal (perceptual and criterial) 
noise (  ). A special case of the UC, the 
Optimal Unidimensional Classifier, assumes 
that participants use the unidimensional 
decision bound that maximizes accuracy. This 
special case has one free parameter (  ) 
Conjunctive Classifier (CC) An alternative 
rule-based strategy is a conjunction rule 
involving separate decisions about the 
stimulus value on the two dimensions with the 
response assignment based on the outcome 
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of these two decisions (Ashby & Gott, 1988). 
The CC assumes that the participant 
partitions the stimulus space into four regions. 
Based on an initial inspection of the data, two 
versions of the CC were fit to these data. One 
version assumes that individuals assigned a 
stimulus to category B if it was high on spatial 
frequency and low on orientation (i.e., the 
bars are thin and shallow); otherwise the 
stimulus would be assigned to category A. 
The other version assumes that individuals 
assigned a stimulus to category A if it was low 
on spatial frequency and high on orientation 
(i.e., the bars are thick and steep); otherwise 
the stimulus would be assigned to category B. 
The CC has three free parameters: the 
decision criteria on the two dimensions and a 
common value of    for the two dimensions.  
Information-Integration Models 
The Linear Classifier (LC) This model 
assumes that a linear decision bound 
partitions the stimulus space into two regions. 
The LC differs from the CC in that the LC 
does not assume decisional selective-
attention (Ashby & Townsend, 1986). This 
produces an information-integration decision 
strategy because it requires linear integration 
of the perceived values on the stimulus 
dimensions. The LC has three parameters, 
slope and intercept of the linear bound, and 
  .  
The Minimum Distance Classifier (MDC). This 
model assumes that there are a number of 
units representing a low-resolution map of the 
stimulus space (Ashby & Waldron, 1999; 
Ashby et al., 2001; Maddox et al., 2004). On 
each trial, the participant determines which 
unit is closest to the perceived stimulus and 
produces the associated response. The 
version of the MDC tested here assumes two 
units because the category structures were 
generated from two multivariate normal 
distributions. Because the location of one of 
the units can be fixed, and because a uniform 
expansion or contraction of the space will not 
affect the location of the minimum-distance 
decision bounds, the MDC has four free 
parameters (three determining the location of 
the units and   ). 
Random Responder Models 
Equal Response Frequency (ERF) This model 
assumes that participants randomly assign 
stimuli to the two response frequencies in a 
manner that preserves the category base 
rates (i.e., 50% of the stimuli in each 
category). This model has no free 
parameters. 
Biased Response Frequency (BRF) This 
model assumes that participants randomly 
assign stimuli to the two response 
frequencies in a manner that matches the 
participant’s categorization response 
frequencies (i.e., the percentage of stimuli in 
each category is computed from the observed 
response frequencies). This model has no 
free parameters. Although the ERF and BRF 
are assumed to be consistent with guessing, 
these models would also likely provide the 
best account of participants that frequently 
shift to very different strategies. 
Model Fitting  
The model parameters were estimated using 
maximum likelihood (Ashby, 1992b; Wickens, 
1982) and the goodness-of-fit statistic was 
BIC = r lnN - 2lnL, 
where N is the sample size, r is the number of 
free parameters, and L is the likelihood of the 
model given the data (Schwarz, 1978). The 
BIC statistic penalizes a model for poor fit and 
for extra free parameters. To find the best 
model among a set of competitors, one simply 
computes a BIC value for each model, and 
then chooses the model with the smallest 
BIC. For data analysis purposes, the best-
fitting models were classified as being task 
appropriate or not. For the RB task, the UC 
models were task appropriate. For the II task, 
the LC and MDC were task appropriate. 
Appendix B: Experiment 2 Script 
The participant was informed of the name of 
their fictitious partner just prior to interacting 
with the fictitious partner via an intercom 
system. The fictitious partner (Jen or John) 
and the participant were matched on gender. 
Below is an example for a female participant. 
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Experimenter (speaking into the 
intercom): Ok, Jen go ahead and introduce 
yourself to your partner. 
Fictitious Partner (recording played over 
the intercom): Hi my name is Jen, nice to 
meet you. 
Experimenter (speaking to the 
participant): Now go ahead and introduce 
yourself to Jen. 
… After the participant responds… 
Experimenter (speaking into the 
intercom): Jen, do you have anything you 
would like to tell your partner about the task? 
Fictitious Partner (recording played over 
the intercom):  Umm…no not really. Except…I 
did meet the criterion, so it is all up to 
you…good luck. 
Experimenter (speaking to the 
participant): Great. Now that you have been 
introduced, let’s get started. Remember, you 
will have a chance to discuss your 
performance with your partner afterward. The 
computer will reiterate many of the directions I 
have discussed with you, so if you have any 
questions feel free to speak up. Also, the 
computer will remind you of your partner’s 
performance throughout the task, so when 
you get to the final block you will know how 
well you need to perform. 
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